Axing Attack: Will Australia Dud Its Fourth Submarine Builder?
For the third time Australia has severed relationships with a partner selected to assist the RAN acquire submarines. The decision to acquire nuclear powered submarines using the newly created AUKUS arrangements and prematurely end the Attack class program adds to the list of barely considered ‘politicians picks’ in Australian defence equipment selection, along with classics such as the F-111 and F-35.
Yet although the agreement of the United States to release its nuclear propulsion technology is historically significant, subsequent discussion largely has been misguided. The submarines will be the last technology that Australia will see delivered and it is likely that the digital technologies of cyber warfare, quantum computing and artificial intelligence will have transformed the nature of warfare before they have arrived, suggesting that the acquisition of the submarines is by no means certain, at least in the terms that have so far been revealed.
Despite an undertaking to construct the submarines in Adelaide the decision is more likely to mark the gradual decay of Australia’s sovereign submarine enterprise. Given the dearth of information on the SSN project it is not surprising that there is already speculation on whether the new class will be built in Australia. Should the submarines enter service they will be expensive, isolated defence orphans. So shaky is the data supporting the program that it would not be surprising should the force of circumstances by the 2040s lead to the curtailing of the program and thus the premature severing of connections with a fourth Australian submarine provider.
The focus of the agreement was cooperation on security and defence technologies; these were cited as “cyber”, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies and “additional undersea capabilities”.
However, the focus of the announcement was that the first initiative under AUKUS would be Australian access to nuclear powered submarine technology based on the highly enriched weapons-grade uranium nuclear reactor cycles (HEU) operated by the US and Britain – not surprising for a statement headed “Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines through new trilateral enhanced security partnership”.
Next to catch attention (it would seem in a way that the government did not quite expect) was the consequential cancellation of the Attack class submarine program, dismissed with the equivalent of a jolly pat on the back to all of those now no longer required. This was never likely to be adequate compensation for ending a $90 billion program for which French industry was expecting undertakings of $54 billion.
What wasn’t mentioned in assessing the weight of French angst was that this was the third time that Australia had severed relationships with a partner selected to assist the RAN acquire submarines. In 1999 Kockums, the designer of the Collins class and 49 per cent shareholder in the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC), was taken over by German interests. The Australian government quickly ejected the Swedish company by buying out its equity in ASC the following year.
Then, in 2014 Prime Minister Tony Abbott struck a handshake agreement with Japanese Prime Minister Abe to have all of the projected future submarines built in Japan. A storm of outrage from his South Australian backbench (home of ASC) forced him to institute a selection process for the new design, to be built in Australia. The Japanese were not chosen.
When Politicians Meddle
The history of politicians meddling in defence procurement is not a happy one. In the middle years of the Second World War Adolf Hitler demanded that the still-developing Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter should be produced as a bomber. This and other high-level Nazi Party interference helped deny Germany the invulnerable air superiority weapon it needed to regain control of the air war over Europe.
Two decades later the Australian Defence Minister, Athol Townley, disregarded Air Force selection procedures to negotiate the purchase from America of the "swing-wing" F-111. Announcing the decision in late 1963, Prime Minister Menzies indicated the aircraft would be delivered from mid-1968, an action that surprised even the Americans as at that time the design was not yet off the drawing board.
Some 40 years later, soon after a visit of Prime Minister John Howard to the United States, the purchase of the F-35 as the RAAF's replacement for its F-18 fighters was announced without the selection team’s knowledge.
Both projects subsequently suffered technical problems, management inadequacies, schedule blowouts and cost increases before eventually entering Australian service.
A collection of problems led to the Australian F-111s remaining parked in the US, awaiting solutions. Consequently, 24 F-4 Phantom fighter bombers were leased from late 1970 until the arrival of the F-111s in 1973. Once in service, the aircraft demonstrated operational performance so compelling that the RAAF continued to fly it long past the retirement of the equivalent USAF aircraft, by cannibalising parts from its mothballed American counterparts.
In June 2002 Prime Minister John Howard returned from a visit to the US, during which he was briefed by Lockheed Martin, recently selected to develop the F-35 strike fighter. Days later the selection of the F-35 to replace the RAAF’s F-18s and F-111s was announced, even as potential industrial partners were being briefed by the project selection team that evaluation processes had many months to run. Like the F-111 the F-35 was intended to be a multi-service aircraft; it was to be produced as a multi-national program; and it was still on the drawing board.
And, as might be expected, the program languished with developmental problems. Now, after almost two decades of acquisition activity, the RAAF program has lost nearly 10 years. Intended for delivery in 2012 the first Australian aircraft arrived in 2018, with the first RAAF squadron achieving operational status this year.
So, naturally, the RAAF was forced to procure an interim strike fighter, with 24 Super Hornets ordered in 2007 and delivered in time to cover for the retiring F-111 in 2010.
There continue to be doubts about the operational effectiveness of the F-35. However, should the F-35 emulate the F-111 and prove itself in service, it seems likely to replicate its predecessor with demanding sustainment costs. Because of extended delays during delivery, elements of the aircraft’s software are already superseded. For a software-driven design this means there is already a need for upgrades even before the aircraft enters service.
Now we can add to this history a decision to abandon a five year old program to sustain Australia's submarine warfare capability and replace it with a yet-to-be-defined objective of a project for (perhaps 8) nuclear propelled submarines (SSN). So, will this latest political inspiration end with as "colourful" a history as those earlier politician’s picks?
No one can have any idea. The SSN project exists at the moment as an exploratory 18 months feasibility study by the Australian government and a statement of good intentions from its allies the USA and Great Britain.
Nonetheless, there are some important observations that can be made from what has already happened as part of the announcement of AUKUS.
Submarines Still Rule
Over the course of some 70 years the United States has agreed to release its technology for submarine nuclear propulsion to only one other nation, Great Britain. That the US was prepared to reverse this consistent policy and release the technology to a third party as the centerpiece of a new strategic agreement would seem to indicate that both of the current SSN operators expect there to be considerable strategic benefit to be gained from the expanded operation of such vessels.
That this technology will not be operated by the RAN for some two decades would seem to indicate that they expect the technology to remain potent for sufficiently long into the future for the AUKUS initiative to constitute a significant check on China's naval expectations. The Chinese reaction to the news suggests that the PRC recognises some validity in this expectation.
The support of continued submarine acquisition does not necessarily indicate an assumption that submarine operations will retain the same profiles into the future, nor that there is no weight in the observations of the sceptics. This seems to be the implication of the inclusion of other forms of military submarine technology amongst those to be accessed under the AUKUS arrangements.
Instead, these provide an insight into the role of SSN as a component of the AUKUS arrangements. For, although the access to submarine nuclear propulsion technology is truly significant (as much for the change in the US policy as for the extension of the RAN’s technological reach) the boats themselves will be merely platforms whose mission effectiveness from the 2040s onwards (as discussed below) will depend on the utilisation of the digital technologies specified in the announcement of AUKUS.
Poor Understanding Made AUKUS Awkward
The focus on the proposed acquisition of nuclear propulsion technology has subsumed all other considerations. Its corollary of abandoning the Attack class program has generated enough controversy to reinforce this and stifle broader consideration of the implications of AUKUS. Thus discussion of AUKUS has largely been misguided because the submarines will be the last technology to be delivered through it, and it is likely that the digital technologies of cyber warfare, quantum computing and artificial intelligence will have transformed the nature of warfare before they have arrived.
This focus on the presentable rather than on the important lost the message in the launching of AUKUS. As mentioned above, the headline was about the SSN. In the Prime Minister’s statement the digital technologies were mentioned only in passing before the coverage of the nuclear power initiative and the dismissal of the abandoned Attack class program.
The media release was rounded off by more visible weaponry; a list of missile types to be procured for the ADF and citing of the government’s initiative to provide $1 billion to establish a sovereign missile production capability in Australia. The Government’s focus on guided weapons technology had in fact been stated much earlier, at the launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, and the local manufacturing element had been launched on 31 March 2021.
Amongst the missile programs mentioned was the collaborative US-Australian program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile (now known as SCIFiRE), first publicised in January 2021 – initiated through bi-lateral cooperation but not requiring any trilateral cooperative agreement.
Perhaps reference to this hardware was just a hook to encourage visual media to spice up the government’s message with file video. However, the lack of any discussion of the importance of the digital technologies, how AUKUS would facilitate Australia’s access to and strengthen its capacity for security and defence applications in these areas or of the likely benefits, questions just how much interest the government has in them. The answer is important for, if the ADF is not funded to become proficient in the use of such digital technologies, it should perhaps forget about trying to operate SSN.
The ADF is, in fact, preparing for the advent of a defence environment where AI (and its affiliates, robotics and autonomous systems) are major factors in military operations and the RAN has prepared a plan for incorporating those technologies into the development of the Service out to 2040.
The importance of mastering these technologies lies in the rapid growth in the power of AI applications. While there is some contention about the actual rate at which AI power is increasing, there seems to be general agreement that it is exponential. Given that AI will increasingly be utilised across all dimensions of the defence enterprise, it’s worth noting Elon Musk’s observation from a few years ago: “.. if you have a linear response to an exponential threat, it's quite likely the exponential threat will win”.
So, by 2040 evolving digital technologies should be deployed extensively by potential adversaries in the operational environment of RAN nuclear-powered submarines. This should be especially so in areas off East Asia, where their performance on distant trans-oceanic deployments is the main justification for the acquisition of SSN. The combination of increasing computational power, networking and operationally focused AI applications, often on robotic platforms, will make it increasingly possible to detect submarines and localise their positions. This is a problem where an adversary possesses competent and quickly responding countermeasures, including antisubmarine forces, and will change the way that submarine warfare is conducted.
These factors indicate the primary importance of the digital technologies encompassed by the AUKUS agreement and why they must be integrated into submarine systems if the SSN are to be effective in an Australian defence strategy. These pressures are unlikely to ease, with one analysis projecting their impact to be critical across the period when Australia's SSN fleet seems likely to be delivered (say, 2038 to the early 2060s).
However, the evidence suggests that the creation of AUKUS was not about making Australian submarines more effective in a digital future but overwhelmingly about removing the French from the future of Australian submarines. Media reporting has mentioned that exploratory discussions began in April 2020 to test the permeability of the United States’ ban on the release of its submarine nuclear propulsion technologies. By February 2021 senior officers (principally Vice-Admiral Jonathan Mead, Chief Joint Capabilities and Commodore Tim Brown, Director General Submarine Capability) were authorized to explore alternatives to the existing Naval Group contract. In May this work had progressed sufficiently to provoke a deal of media speculation on the government's appetite for moving to a “Plan B” and provoked terse exchanges over nondisclosure of these activities within Senate estimates committee hearings [pp 35-48].
So, in this sense at least, AUKUS was driven by dissatisfaction with the Attack class program, up until and including the conjunction of the arrangement’s launch and the termination of the contract with Naval Group. Or, as Defence Secretary Moriarty said in explaining why a select group in the Department were pursuing alternative “capability pathways” [p. 45]:
Because it became clear to me that we were having challenges with the Attack class program over the last 12 months, so of course you do reasonably prudent thinking about what one of those options might be or what you might be able to do if you were unable to proceed.
The government’s frustration with elements of Naval Group’s performance had been visible at points throughout the program but, nonetheless, in a meeting in Paris between Prime Minister Morrison and President Macron in June, Morrison expressed satisfaction with the situation of the Attack program. However, he predicated continuing support on Australia approving the French builder’s response to the next system review, due before the end of September.
This review was to evaluate the proposals for design, costs and schedule leading to the further design in preparation for the beginning of construction activities around 2024.
Following the furious response of the French Government to Australia’s decision, Morrison disputed this version of what he was recorded as saying (without issuing any correction) in Paris back in June. A week later, following the announcement of AUKUS, the Australian Prime Minister was arguing that he had told the French President a conventional submarine “would no longer be meeting our strategic interests and what we needed those boats to do”.
We do not know to what extent the formal elements of the AUKUS agreement had been settled at the time the leaders of the US, Great Britain and Australia met in Cornwall in April to discuss the progress of AUKUS. Whatever the status of the submarine issue, those parts of the arrangements covering the sharing of cyber warfare, AI, quantum technologies and other undersea technologies were themselves of sufficient moment to both provide a potent basis for a military technology sharing arrangement and to constitute an unmistakable statement of strategic intent in the Indo-Pacific.
On this basis, it should have been possible to announce the creation of AUKUS at some point over the few months after Cornwall, initially excluding explicit mention of the nuclear propulsion option - which, after all, remains nothing more than a hypothetical subject for further investigation. A little urgency could have allowed the launch of AUKUS before Morrison’s meeting with the French President in June, providing a context for subsequent “assessment” to change the nature of Australia’s submarine requirements in light of the implications of the digital technologies for future warfare.
This would have given time to expose the French to Australia’s changing strategic objectives and a little more leeway to prepare the ground before the September judgment on Naval Group’s proposals to advance the Attack program. It would also have blunted the Chinese reaction, which while probably still strong would have had less impact, given the somewhat ambiguous nature of most of the technologies involved and the general knowledge that China is already exploiting them against other nations.
In any case, the Australian government seems not to have seen it as either a legal or moral undertaking to advise the French of its changed objectives before the outcome of the systems review that Morrison himself had nominated as crucial. On 15 September, the day before AUKUS was revealed, the Defence Department sent a letter from the Future Submarine Program to its French counterparts.
According to the French Ministry of Defence, it said Australia had “taken a close look at the state of progress in the contract, in line with the contract, and was extremely satisfied that performance of the French submarine was excellent, which clearly means that we were to move to the next phase of the contract.”
This was not so much moving the goal posts as going home for a spot of on-line gaming. Furthermore, the sequence of events leads to a conclusion that the government had decided to go full Athol Townley by not consulting their team on submarine selection and procurement.
The Slow Death Of A Sovereign Submarine Enterprise
Well before this, however, the RAN was using the term, not as political jargon, but to signify a central concept in the effective maintenance of its submarine warfare capabilities. After suffering a decade of poor operational availability from the Collins class it had concluded that a division responsible for all aspects of submarine acquisition and sustainment was the basis for overcoming the problem. Doing this created a sovereign submarine enterprise.
To carry these lessons forward into the operation of the next generation of RAN submarines, an objective of the Future Submarine Program was to use an overseas submarine builder to assist Australia design and produce a vessel for which Australia controlled the intellectual property. This would support efficient operation of the new class of submarine and allow evolution of its design to meet changes in operational requirements over the years taken to construct a 12 boat program. The concept would be enabled by an industrial base producing a submarine every two years, thus developing the efficiencies of the continuous production process used by successful submarine producers, such as Japan and South Korea.
By dragging out a painful negotiating period, prompting direct Australian Ministerial intervention, Naval Group created the impression that it did not completely understand Australia’s concept of sovereignty. As recently as April the company was under political attack, accused of resisting the transfer of design functions to Australia.
Naval Group had denied that this was the case and presumably, having successfully negotiated the September deadline to pass the Functional Ship System Functional Review required to move into the next stage of design, were now meeting the Australian requirements for the transfer of intellectual property.
Today, of course, there is no intellectual property or sovereign submarine acquisition program to worry over. All that the AUKUS announcement said was that a Nuclear-Powered Submarine Task Force would be created inside the Department of Defence to lead an 18 month study into the regulatory issues involved in the ownership and operation of nuclear powered submarines. The public now knows that a former US Secretary of Navy, who has been acting as the Prime Minister’s special adviser on naval shipbuilding, has been appointed to liaise on these issues with United States officials.
Although the government envisages an 8 boat program to be built in Australia, we do not know what design will be chosen nor on what criteria. The British Astute class appears an early favorite, maybe because its dimensions are closer to that of the Attack design than the considerably longer US Virginia class. Nonetheless, Astute suffered from significant gestational problems, requiring assistance from the US submarine builder General Dynamics Electric Boat (which also provided rectification advice on the Collins) and in many respects appears to be behind Australian practice in production and sustainment.
The Virginias were designed from the outset to reduce the costs of lifetime operation but, nonetheless, place such demands on US shipyards that they are unable to support the level of operational availability required by the USN. This problem is expected to continue through most of the next 30 years.
Further, it seems generally agreed Australia’s new program will cost more than the $90 billion sum estimated for the Attack class. Neither do we know what proportion of local construction will be possible when assembling a pressure hull around an imported nuclear reactor. Allowing for this, local content is unlikely to reach the 60 per cent projected for the construction of Attack. It remains to be seen whether the level of local involvement will be a sufficient basis to support the sovereign enterprise needed for the effective sustainment of future RAN SSN, which seems likely to default to Australian responsibility.
What is more, the government expects the first of class to be operational in the late 2030s, half a decade or more after the schedule for the Attack class. Critics of Australia’s submarine acquisition projects have often claimed the best option is purchase of an off-the-shelf design. Ironically, Australia has finally found such an option that meets its operational requirements and yet it seems to be more expensive and arriving later than the bespoke solution on which the Navy had been working.
So it is not surprising that there is already speculation on whether the new class will be built in Australia. This is supposedly a consideration of whether an accelerated acquisition from overseas might better meet Australia's strategic situation than a program of local construction.
Yet the issue might not be so simple if there is a trade-off between the higher productivity whilst deployed of an SSN versus the lower availability of a fleet with a limited local maintenance capacity and a high reliance on already constrained overseas support. This conundrum is no hypothetical – one of the reasons for building the Collins class submarines locally was that during the 1982 Falklands War the RAN could not procure parts for the maintenance of its British-built Oberon class submarines.
Neither can it be assumed that submarines can be acquired quickly from overseas. As mentioned above, the efficiency of the submarine production process is maintained by a regular and measured output. Spare capacity is a rarity, doubly so for nuclear propelled boats, and does not come with the required skilled workforce. Shortages of skilled labour were a central factor in the early troubles of the Astute class. The USN is seeking to maximize its submarine acquisition rather than diverting from it and, while the last of the Astute class will be launched in 2026, the UK will be preoccupied producing the new Dreadnought class SSBN.
Furthermore, the essential elements of a submarine warfare capability are not cheaply or quickly acquired. Training systems for operators, technicians and other skilled RAN and industry personnel will have to be developed from scratch, with little expertise available in Australia to support the task. One of the few detailed studies of the requirements for Australia to operate an SSN fleet concluded that successfully completing this process would allow the first Australian boat to be commissioned by 2044, if the go ahead was made by the mid 2020s [ASPI Special Report SR129 Australian nuclear propelled submarines, p15].
Consequently, it is easy to see why Australian industry is already apprehensive about the government's new position on Australia's future submarine fleet. Those companies involved in the Attack class program have lost turnover and future output. Some, as subcontractors down the supply chain, may never be compensated for investment already undertaken and no longer required.
The government’s current position is full of consequences and imponderables. Hence no Australian enterprise will have any idea for many years to come what involvement in a future Australian program will mean for industry. In the meantime, the reality of a sovereign submarine enterprise will be slowly dying.
The only life support available will be the Collins life-of-type extension (LOTE) program. All being well, this should cover the period between 2026 and 2038. Together with other systems upgrades planned for the submarines, the LOTE program may provide a limited opportunity to keep abreast of technological developments.
An Isolated Defence Orphan
Regardless of the complexion of Australia's political leadership, these technologies will have a prominent place in the Australian economy, partly because of their cheapness and abundance but also because Australia, with its currently limited manufacturing base, will have to take what the world sends it.
Nuclear energy is unlikely to have a place in this future. This will be simply an outcome of harsh economic & technological realities; by the 2040s Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) will be dominated by low cost variable renewable energy (VRE) generation, and nuclear energy generators with low variability, higher capital and marginal costs and a requirement to operate at high capacity factors for best efficiency will not be readily integrated or competitive in the NEM.
Nuclear generation is highly unlikely to attract energy market investor support without significant levels of public underwriting and adjustments to the NEM operating rules to ensure future nuclear generators could operate efficiently at high capacity factors. Large nuclear generating plants at the scale of existing baseload coal generators are now prohibitively expensive, and there will not be any validation of the operational performance, economics and safety of Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology at nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) scale before the late 2030s/early 2040s. The costs of underwriting a civil nuclear industry would remain on the Federal Budget until well into the second half of the 21st century, probably indefinitely.
Consequently, the Prime Minister's statement that the decision to acquire SSN will not lead to the establishment of an Australian nuclear power industry is one of the few issues raised in the context of AUKUS that appears highly probable.
The only circumstances in which Australia might acquire a civil nuclear industry within the foreseeable future would be a political decision as part of a package to achieve support for commitment to emission targets (to which nuclear energy could only make a marginal contribution). In this scenario Australia might have a few operational nuclear power plants by 2050 (the most optimistic scenario projected recently by the International Atomic Energy Agency is for nuclear energy to contribute 792GW of global electricity generating capacity by 2050 – a doubling of the status quo and about 6% of the anticipated 14TW global electricity capacity).
Therefore, Australia's nuclear powered submarine fleet will most likely be a technological and economic orphan. We can expect little advancement in the technology of what still remains essentially a sophisticated way of generating steam and converting it into electricity at 30-35 per cent efficiency, simply because the focus of energy technology investment will be elsewhere.
Thus, we can expect the restrictions and costs associated with operating nuclear energy systems to be more or less what they are today. Without a commercially viable Australian nuclear power industry, those costs will be borne by the Federal budget. The restrictions and requirements that come with the field will be a compliance and training burden for government and Defence, with little financial offset for the taxpayer.
The ownership and operation of nuclear propulsion technology is neither trivial nor simple, especially so when the reactor core houses highly enriched weapons grade uranium (HEU). This has implications for safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which the government wishes to uphold) and for public safety in both the case of accidents and the potential for terrorist activity. The government is not being excessive in allocating eighteen months to investigate these issues. The French lost three years in the development of their nuclear-powered Barracuda class submarine (on which the design of Attack was based) because of such regulatory issues, despite many decades of experience with nuclear power and the use of the less regulatorily sensitive low enriched uranium (LEU).
Despite the government's claim that Australia can now operate nuclear powered submarines because the HEU system is fuelled for the lifetime of the vessel, the reactor and its powertrain (non-radioactive steam generator, turbine and gear installations) is not some form of seagoing white goods that can be plugged in and forgotten. Submarines require major maintenance, taking several years, at fixed stages during their lives and at these points the non-nuclear machinery will have to be removed and overhauled separate from its fissile boiler.
During such periods the reactor will be decommissioned (that is "turned off") but the boats will be sitting on dry land (presumably in Port Adelaide) if sustainment of the SSN fleet is an Australian responsibility. Despite the good safety record of the nuclear power system in US and British submarines, there might still be some way to go to ensure that locals are happy with the prospect of a reactor sitting in their suburb or downwind, for several years.
The critical point is that the new submarine program will remain as contentious, probably more so, as the Attack class that preceded it. As an undertaking divorced from the main themes in Australia's economic and industrial activity the SSN program will be vulnerable to the types of ridicule that appear to have driven the government to change course on the future submarine program. It is significant that no one quotes the Prime Minister in full when enumerating the scope of the program, because few believe the "at least" when the cost of 8 boats already exceeds the estimate for the Attack program and Great Britain itself can only afford seven of its Astute class SSN.
Despite the apparent operational advantages of nuclear propulsion, future cost increases, schedule blowouts or failure to sustain Australian industrial workload are likely to prove just as poisonous to the SSN program as they were to its predecessor. Ultimately, an Australian SSN might prove so expensive to run that, whatever its benefits, alternative platforms with adequate performance but lower costs of ownership might be preferred and the SSN sent on the way of the F-111, good to have but too expensive to own.
At the same time, developments from within the dominant renewable energy economy are likely to result in light metal battery systems that, when applied to submarines, can match the performance of SSN in most regards except transit time during deployment. They will be cheaper to acquire and operate with less developmental risk because the energy technology will be supported by the weight of research and development in the private sector. If a proliferation of ocean sensor systems increases the risk of deploying a small number of large boats or renders submarine operations more profitable in nationally controlled waters, concepts of operation for Australian submarines may well change and high performance battery powered boats could become best suited to Australia’s circumstances.
Despite its many attractions, the SSN program will be just as vulnerable to future recrimination as the Attack program that it replaced. Cost, schedule, viability in the operational environment, strategic and political turbulence - all represent areas of risk in what at the moment is basically an unconsidered leap of faith.
Should any of the negative factors cause a reevaluation of the SSN program, the search for alternatives will become just as contentious as the questioning of the Attack program over the last 18 months. In that case it would be no surprise to see the SSN program curtailed and, whatever our defence arrangements under AUKUS, Australia abandon agreements with its fourth submarine builder.
Derek Woolner & David Glynne Jones
October 2021
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