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Introducing the Woolner & Jones blog

A chance conversation about submarines and emerging battery technology in 2012 lead to a six-year long dialogue and the shared conclusion that Australia's Future Submarine Program faced significant technology challenges in the coming decades. In early 2019 we co-authored a series of three articles on this subject  ( Future Proofing the Attack-class , ASPI  The Strategist , June-July 2019) , intended for publication just prior to the May 2019 Federal Election.  Delays in editing the articles to meet publication requirements meant that the articles weren't published until after the election, and were substantially altered from our original submissions. We determined that we needed more effective control over both the timing and content of future publications and posts, and have established our blog-of-record for this purpose.  Our published articles will be evidence-based with provided references, and where we are expressing views or opinions we will indicate this ...

Six Years On

  In 2019 we published a series of articles titled ' Future-proofing the Attack class ' in ASPI's The Strategist. In those articles we contended that, if constructed with lead acid main batteries, the first submarines of the Attack class would be obsolescent by the time they were commissioned in the early-mid 2030s. Our contention proved to be correct, and in September 2021 the Morrison Government announced the cancellation of the Attack class project and the pivot to nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement with the US and UK. In 2025 we reviewed subsequent progress in the adoption of light metal battery (LMB) technology for conventional non-nuclear submarines, and came to several conclusions: LMB technology will be the dominant battery technology for new conventional submarines entering service from 2030 onwards Continuing development of LMB technology will lead to a new class of all-electric submarine (SSE), capable of zero-indiscretion missions of significan...

And So It Came To Pass: The rise of the light metal battery submarine (Part I of 'Six Years On')

The recent US review of the AUKUS agreement underlines the glacial and uncertain route taken by Australia to secure nuclear powered submarines. Meanwhile, other nations are proceeding to more rapidly upgrade the capability of their submarine forces. Some six years ago we forecast that the adoption of light metal  battery (LMB) energy systems for conventional submarines would revolutionise their performance. Today, that is becoming reality. Under the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA, the RAN is scheduled to receive three American nuclear powered submarines (SSN) between 2032 and later in the decade. Five British designed but locally built SSNs will follow from the early 2040s. This plan replaced a program to build 12 conventional Attack class SSKs in Australia, with the first in service around 2034. It is the first part of the agreement concerning the US-sourced SSNs that is now subject to a review by the US Department of Defence. HMAS Attack ...

As It Was Written, So Shall it Be: The coming of the SSE (Part II of 'Six Years On')

Submarines with LMB energy systems have now emerged as the standard for conventional designs. The pace and extent of their future capability and performance is already foreshadowed by commercial battery development. This will lead to the emergence of the all-electric submarine, the SSE, as coastal boats in the 2030s and as a fully transoceanic design by the 2050s, challenging the superiority of nuclear-powered submarines in regional waters by mid-century. In Part 1 we described the current emergence of new submarine construction programs with energy requirements provided by Light Metal Batteries (LMB), primarily lithium-based battery chemistries. Submarines with LMB energy systems are now in operational service and we outlined that by 2030 some 20 submarines with such systems could be deployed in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Submarine Operating Environment (IAPSOE). Numbers could conceivably rise to more than 60 by 2040. It’s also expected that significant numbers of LMB-powered autonomous ...

The Line it is Drawn: The Critical Issues for Australia’s Future Undersea Warfare Capability (Part III of 'Six Years On')

The RAN’s existing Collins fleet will remain its most important submarine asset over the next two decades, providing operational capacity and supporting development of new technologies. It provides the only element of risk mitigation in transitioning to an SSN force and the future management of the class should be more carefully considered. The Government’s discourse on the RAN’s subsea warfare capability over the next quarter of a century promotes a vision based on an increasing number of nuclear powered submarines (SSNs). In reality, the Navy’s subsea force over most of this period will be provided largely by its existing Collins class submarines and Ghost Shark Autonomous Underwater Vessels (XL-AUV). The Collins will remain the most numerous crewed Australian submarine into the 2040s. The schedules for the acquisition of RAN SSNs are extremely long term. Even the most optimistic expectations of the program to provide three interim US Virginia class SSNs will see it occupying the...

Yes Virginia, there is a vertical launch capability: ADDENDUM

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Addendum: And Then, What Else Might China Do? When you attempt to join the big league, it should be no surprise that the established players take you seriously. So, as Australia has sought a place in the strategic manoeuvring in the conflict between China and Taiwan through the formation of AUKUS, it should be no surprise that China would take steps to neutralise Australia's presence. Already strongly placed with its submarine warfare developments, China is now developing further options to restrict Australia's capacity to mount a submarine-based challenge to China's interests. One such option became apparent in late March when the text of a proposed security arrangement between the People's Republic of China and the Solomon Islands was leaked. Much of the text was vague and imprecise but it immediately raised the possibility that China might be setting up conditions that would allow it to position naval vessels in the Solomons. Even the faint possibility of ...