Yes Virginia, there is a vertical launch capability: Dutton confirms US SSNs

Speaking about the next RAN submarines on ABC Insiders on Sunday 6 March Australia’s Defence Minister Peter Dutton spoke the magic words ’vertical launch system’. Answering a question on whether Australia would contemplate joining military action against China in defence of Taiwan he said that “keeping Australians safe” led to the AUKUS agreement “to acquire the nuclear .. sub capability .. [that] allows potentially a vertical launch system or some use of missiles which would speak to a very strong deterrence message.”

This is virtually a commitment to acquiring the US Virginia-class SSN (nuclear-powered attack submarine), as the UK’s Astute-class SSN does not have a vertical launch system (VLS) in its design. It also sets free a huge mound of wriggling policy and operational worms.

PM Morrison and Defence Minister Dutton are at odds over the timing of the submarine decision (post-election or in the next few weeks) and the feasibility of the project is supposed to be the subject of an enquiry not due to report until early-mid 2023. Yet Morrison’s announcement of an East Coast base has effectively confirmed that a decision has already been made, and that it will be the US Virginia-class (for reasons provided below).

1. What is the role of Australia’s new nuclear powered submarines?

The selection of a submarine design based on the deterrent value of its missile armament signifies that the program to provide a new submarine for the RAN has become more than simply the acquisition of a new class of vessel. It raises important questions about the unconscious reshaping of Australia’s defence policy. This arises through consideration of the question of the role of Australia’s new class of submarine in the light of the Defence Minister’s statement. Is the next generation of submarine to be acquired for submarine warfare (as an SSN) or shore bombardment (SSGN)?

Virginia-class SSNs have been fitted with VLS since the Block III boats entered service in 2014. Both Block III and Block IV Virginias are fitted with two Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) forward of the sail, each capable of carrying 6 Tomahawk cruise missiles, for a total of 12.

Block V Virginias, which commenced construction in 2019 and will enter service in 2024, will also be fitted with four Virginia Payload Modules (VPM) in a new 25-metre long hull section, each capable of carrying 7 Tomahawk cruise missiles, for a total of 40 missiles.

Block V Virginias will also be capable of carrying new hypersonic missiles that have been referred to by the Morrison Government as part of the AUKUS package.

The Virginia Block V is the version that the USN is now moving to acquire and will be building when Australia commences acquisition of its SSNs (construction of Block IV is ending in 2022), noting the repeated statements by both the Government and Nuclear-powered Submarine Taskforce, that Australia will be acquiring a ‘mature submarine design’.

The US Navy’s priority for Block V is to replace its SSGNs (SSBNs converted to carry vertically launched Tomahawk cruise missiles). Short-warning Tomahawk attack from an SSGN has been the standard initiation of major US offensive operations (such as against Libya) in recent years. The existing SSGNs are phasing out and the USN wants to sustain the capability. Block V will give them a capacity for 40 Tomahawks or a future mix of Tomahawks (subsonic) and hypersonic missiles.

This is a boat that is not so much a traditional hunter/killer submarine as an aircraft carrier. In fact, the Block V represents such a shift away from the traditional characteristics of the SSN that the US Navy’s goals for its next design (the SSN(X)) will emphasise more specific ASW criteria.

Instead, the Block V is optimized for shore bombardment, with the plethora of missiles allowing for salvo attacks that may be required to strike some heavily defended targets. SSNs launching cruise missiles from torpedo tubes cannot achieve this weight of fire. The Block V Virginia is not as sustainable in the offensive role as an aircraft carrier but it has the same role of projecting naval power against land targets. For the SSGN, the impact of surprise supports different strategic objectives to the grinding persistence of a carrier group assault.

2. VLS-equipped SSGNs constitute a more direct threat to PLA planning.


Until now the most credible explanation for the USA granting Australia access to their nuclear-powered submarine technology has been that the RAN nuclear-powered submarines would provide extra security against the prospect of Chinese SSBNs reaching the open western Pacific and thus more greatly compromising the security of the US mainland.

It’s frequently noted that US security guarantees to Taiwan are circumscribed by the proliferation of PLA shore based missile systems in the provinces adjacent to Taiwan. This makes it dangerous for the USN to interpose any major surface vessels (particularly carrier task force groups) in the waters between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.

Yet, what if the US could take out those missile systems with little warning and without exposing any surface ships? Or, to avoid immediately plunging into WW3, could indicate to the Chinese that their cover for an invasion of Taiwan could be vulnerable to covert, short-reaction time attack?

And would Australia be planning to assist by adding further salvos of cruise missiles to the “deterrence message”?

3. What will be the strategic implications of acquiring Virginia Block V?

If any of the above seems true, the Morrison government is committing Australia to a strategy of Iraq on water (or under it). Having recently been shown the folly of committing support to the US on far away desert sands, Australia is proposing to do the same thing under distant waters. This is an amazingly quick pivot for PM Morrison, considering that the AUKUS deal was being made at the same time as US President Biden signaled that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan meant the end of land-based US foreign wars.

Whatever the truth of this observation, it’s going to be what the acquisition of Virginia Block V looks like that is going to be important. Leaving aside the issues around the future domestic stability of the US (where the future of that country as a coherent democratic nation state is now being openly discussed), awareness of the implications of the Australian SSN/SSGN decision will have powerful implications for domestic politics and Australian foreign policy.

In the case of the latter, many regional countries will not be happy to be implicated in a policy that may seem overtly hostile to China. This might actually go some way to compromising whatever tenuous resolve against Chinese assertiveness has been achieved of late. Some regional countries will probably want to disassociate themselves from any implications of Australia acquiring Virginia Block V SSGNs.

It will be especially serious if one of them is Indonesia. That country has recently expressed reservations about the AUKUS SSN outcome. It also has long held that all the waterways enclosed by the archipelago are Indonesian internal waters over which it has sovereignty. If it feels its relationship with China is sufficiently compromised by the Australian decision (something China will probably work on), Indonesia may well seek to complicate the passage northward of Australian SSGNs. This will become easier as Indonesia works with South Korea to regenerate its submarine force with very capable modern non-nuclear submarines.

4. How will China respond?


China already has a substantial submarine force, albeit one that currently includes a significant number of older submarine types. However it operates a wide range of submarine types and is developing new submarines that will progressively replace older types.

What is notable is that China is putting its submarine eggs in a number of different baskets, including advanced and more affordable non-nuclear submarines.

While China is constructing new Type 093 Shang-class SSNs, with four entering service in the mid-late 2020s (some fitted with VLS), it is not attempting to match the SSN/SSGN strength of the US Navy.

Rather it is focusing on the development and rapid construction of more affordable advanced non-nuclear submarines, including the latest version of the Type 039 Yuan-class diesel-electric attack submarine with air-independent propulsion (AIP), which provides extended stealthy submerged patrol endurance.

Currently there are 18 Type 039A and 039B submarines in service, and there are indications that China intends to build around 25 of the latest version – the Type 039D – by around 2030. This would bring the Yuan-class fleet to about 35 submarines.

While not confirmed there is a possibility that some of these new Yuan-class submarines could also be equipped with lithium-ion batteries in addition to AIP, and this would further enhance their submerged endurance and performance.

There are also indications that China may be developing advanced all-electric (SSE) small submarines (around 50m in length, 400-500 tonnes displacement) fitted with AIP or lithium-ion batteries, or a combination of both, with no on-board diesel generators. The first generation of these submarines would have a submerged patrol endurance of around 3 weeks, and would likely be used for coastal patrols and special operations.

As advanced battery performance increases, it is conceivable that in the 2030s and 2040s these SSEs could acquire blue-water capabilities, with a submerged patrol endurance of 30-40 days, fast stealthy submerged transit capability of 500-700nm in 24 to 48 hours, and strengthened sensor and combat system capabilities.

In addition to new submarine types China is also developing and deploying a range of autonomous underwater vehicles and extensive sub-sea sensor networks. Open-source intelligence sources (OSINT) suggest that China is already able to detect the approach of foreign submarines at a distance of around 1700nm (3100km) from the Chinese coastline, which is outside the maximum operational range of the Tomahawk cruise missile (2500km).

The strategy of China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) is quite clear – increasingly early detection of potentially hostile submarines complemented by deployment of quantitatively superior ASW submarine forces sufficient to make the risks of moving into cruise missile range from the Chinese mainland very high.

China’s sub-sea defence capabilities will be significant by 2030, and it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to develop and strengthen through the 2030s and 2040s, across the timeframe that Australia will be acquiring its SSN/SSGN force.

5. Can we handle the things anyway?


To get the capability the USN wants in its Block V Virginia class requires a submarine that is nearly as big as an SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine), at 140 metres in length and 10,000 plus tonnes displacement – nearly twice the length of Collins and three times the displacement. And that needs a crew of around 130, compared to 60 for Collins.

All of this points to enormous project risk, especially if the boats are built locally, which may well be necessary given the lack of capacity at US nuclear submarine construction sites. It should be noted that acquisition of equipment from a major US producer has not guaranteed trouble free procurement in the past and does not at present.

Australia will have to develop local capacity and assure access to relevant knowledge to solve unexpected issues involving unfamiliar technology. Ensuring that this capability is available could require changes beyond the Defence acquisition sphere, such as considering the position of the Defence Science and Technology Group in Australian nuclear research.

Successful delivery of the boats will be followed by high costs of ownership. The Block V boats are projected to have a service life of about 33 years, with an operational cycle of 6 years followed by a 1.5 year major refit (EDSRA – Extended Dry-docking Selected Restricted Availability), which is estimated to require 290,000 days of labour. This includes the time required to ‘layup’ the nuclear propulsion reactor and make it safe before dry-docking and during the refit.

Another major issue, now confirmed by PM Morrison’s announcement of an East Coast base for Australia’s future submarines, is the need to change the mode of operation and force posture to deploy large SSN/SSGNs. A submarine as large as the Virginia Block V will be difficult to transit covertly through the Indonesian archipelago (Oberon submarines of yore have detected the passage of Soviet SSNs). Further, as noted above, in some circumstances trying to navigate the Indonesian archipelago could become subject to home nation challenge.

The East Coast base will allow RAN SSGNs to deploy into deep water and transit into the Pacific around New Guinea, with minimal risk of detection and without loss of time on station. Presumably, much of the operational maintenance for nuclear powered submarines will be concentrated there, much as it is for the Collins class in Fremantle. We do not know as yet where the major refits (currently undertaken in Adelaide for the Collins class) are to be performed for the nuclear powered submarines.

It should be noted that, when announcing the new East Coast submarine base, PM Morrison confirmed that the existing West Coast base (HMAS Stirling) would be retained for Indian Ocean submarine operations.

6. Conclusions


What most people don’t seem to notice (and we suspect the government doesn’t comprehend) is that the single issue about what to do with the Attack class program is leading to commitments for many aspects of national security that are quickly becoming irreversible, or will incur very significant expenditures to undo.

Australia’s government seems to be approaching the nation’s future security within the same strategic mindset that has seen Australian soldiers in the Middle East over the last two decades. This time they are attempting to replace the troops with technologically sophisticated platforms but haven’t noticed that the focus of policy is not an ethnically riven failed state but a major global power.

The decision to acquire nuclear propelled submarines assumes that this technology will retain operational effectiveness across the span of more than two decades before they become a physical reality. This is a proposition that needs to be thoroughly tested against the response of the global power, manifest in China’s rapidly developing sub-sea defence capabilities over the same period.

Derek Woolner & David Glynne Jones

March 2022


Explanatory note: Submarine hull designations

SSI/SSP: Attack Submarine (Diesel-Electric with Air-Independent Propulsion)
SS/SSK:  Attack Submarine (Diesel-Electric Power)
SSG:       Guided Missile Submarine (Diesel-Electric Power)
SSN:       Attack Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSGN:     Guided Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSBN:     Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSE:       Attack Submarine (All-electric Power) (W&J proposed classification)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hull_classifications#S


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