Speaking
about the next RAN submarines on ABC
Insiders on Sunday 6 March
Australia’s Defence Minister Peter Dutton spoke the magic words
’vertical launch system’. Answering a question on whether
Australia would contemplate joining military action against China in
defence of Taiwan he said that “keeping Australians safe” led to
the AUKUS agreement “to acquire the nuclear .. sub capability ..
[that] allows potentially a vertical launch system or some use of
missiles which would speak to a very strong deterrence message.”
This
is virtually a commitment to acquiring the US Virginia-class SSN
(nuclear-powered attack submarine), as the UK’s Astute-class SSN
does not have a vertical launch system (VLS) in its design.
It
also sets free a huge mound of wriggling policy and operational
worms.
PM
Morrison and Defence Minister Dutton are at odds over the timing of
the submarine decision (post-election or in the next few weeks) and
the feasibility of the project is supposed to be the
subject of an enquiry
not due to report until early-mid 2023. Yet Morrison’s announcement
of an East Coast base has effectively confirmed that a decision has
already been made, and that it will be the US Virginia-class (for
reasons provided below). 1.
What is the role of Australia’s new nuclear powered submarines?
The
selection of a submarine design based on the deterrent value of its
missile armament signifies that the program to provide a new
submarine for the RAN has become more than simply the acquisition of
a new class of vessel. It raises important questions about the
unconscious reshaping of Australia’s defence policy. This arises
through consideration of the question of the role of Australia’s
new class of submarine in the light of the Defence Minister’s
statement. Is the next generation of submarine to be acquired for
submarine warfare (as an SSN) or shore bombardment
(SSGN)?
Virginia-class
SSNs have been fitted with VLS since the Block III boats entered
service in 2014. Both Block III and Block IV Virginias are fitted
with two Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) forward of the sail, each
capable of carrying 6 Tomahawk cruise missiles, for a total of 12.
Block
V Virginias,
which commenced construction in 2019 and will enter service in 2024,
will also be fitted with four
Virginia Payload Modules
(VPM) in a new 25-metre long hull section, each capable of carrying 7
Tomahawk cruise missiles, for a total of 40 missiles.
Block
V Virginias will also be capable of carrying new
hypersonic missiles
that have been referred to by the Morrison Government as part of the
AUKUS package.
The
Virginia
Block V
is the version that the USN is now moving to acquire and will be
building when Australia commences acquisition of its SSNs
(construction of Block IV is ending in 2022), noting the repeated
statements by both the Government and Nuclear-powered Submarine
Taskforce, that Australia will be acquiring a ‘mature submarine
design’.
The
US Navy’s priority for Block V is to replace its SSGNs (SSBNs
converted to carry vertically launched Tomahawk cruise missiles).
Short-warning Tomahawk attack from an SSGN has been the standard
initiation of major US offensive operations (such as against Libya)
in recent years. The existing SSGNs are phasing out and the USN wants
to sustain the capability.
Block
V will give them a capacity for 40 Tomahawks or a future mix of
Tomahawks (subsonic) and hypersonic missiles.
This
is a boat that is not so much a traditional
hunter/killer submarine
as an aircraft carrier. In fact, the Block V represents such a shift
away from the traditional characteristics of the SSN that the US
Navy’s goals for its next design (the SSN(X)) will
emphasise more specific ASW criteria.
Instead,
the Block V is optimized for shore bombardment, with
the plethora of missiles allowing for salvo attacks that may be
required to strike some heavily defended targets. SSNs launching
cruise missiles from torpedo tubes cannot achieve this weight of
fire. The Block V Virginia is
not as sustainable in the offensive role as an aircraft carrier but
it has the same role of projecting naval power against land targets.
For the SSGN, the impact of surprise supports different strategic
objectives to the grinding persistence of a carrier group assault.
2.
VLS-equipped
SSGNs constitute a more direct threat to PLA planning.
Until
now the most credible explanation for the USA granting Australia
access to their nuclear-powered submarine technology has been that
the RAN nuclear-powered submarines would provide extra security
against the prospect of Chinese SSBNs reaching the open western
Pacific and thus more greatly compromising the security of the US
mainland.
It’s
frequently noted that US security guarantees to Taiwan are
circumscribed by the proliferation of PLA shore based missile systems
in the provinces adjacent to Taiwan. This makes it dangerous for the
USN to interpose any major surface vessels (particularly carrier task
force groups) in the waters between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.
Yet,
what if the US could take out those missile systems with little
warning and without exposing any surface ships? Or, to avoid
immediately plunging into WW3, could indicate to the Chinese that
their cover for an invasion of Taiwan could be vulnerable to covert,
short-reaction time attack?
And
would Australia be planning to assist by adding
further salvos of cruise missiles to
the “deterrence message”?
3.
What will be the strategic implications of acquiring Virginia Block
V?
If
any of the above seems true, the Morrison government is committing
Australia to a strategy of Iraq on water (or under it). Having
recently been shown the folly of committing support to the US on far
away desert sands, Australia is proposing to do the same thing under
distant waters. This is an amazingly quick pivot for PM Morrison,
considering that the AUKUS deal was being made at the same time as US
President Biden signaled that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan
meant the end of land-based US foreign wars.
Whatever
the truth of this observation, it’s going to be what the
acquisition of Virginia Block V looks like that is going to be
important. Leaving aside the issues around the future domestic
stability of the US (where the future of that country as a coherent
democratic nation state is now being openly discussed), awareness of
the implications of the Australian SSN/SSGN decision will have
powerful implications for domestic politics and Australian foreign
policy.
In
the case of the latter, many regional countries will not be happy to
be implicated in a policy that may seem overtly hostile to China.
This might actually go some way to compromising whatever tenuous
resolve against Chinese assertiveness has been achieved of late. Some
regional countries will probably want to disassociate themselves from
any implications of Australia acquiring Virginia Block V SSGNs.
It
will be especially serious if one of them is Indonesia. That country
has recently expressed reservations about the AUKUS SSN outcome. It
also has long held that all the waterways enclosed by the archipelago
are Indonesian internal waters over which it has sovereignty. If it
feels its relationship with China is sufficiently compromised by the
Australian decision (something China will probably work on), Indonesia may well seek to complicate the passage northward of
Australian SSGNs. This will become easier as Indonesia works with
South Korea to regenerate its submarine force with very
capable modern non-nuclear submarines. 4.
How will China respond?
China
already has a substantial submarine force, albeit one that currently
includes a significant number of older submarine types. However it
operates a
wide range of submarine types
and is developing new submarines that will progressively replace
older types.
What
is notable is that China is putting its submarine eggs in a number of
different baskets, including advanced and more affordable non-nuclear
submarines.
While
China is constructing new Type
093 Shang-class SSNs,
with four entering service in the mid-late 2020s (some fitted with
VLS), it is not attempting to match the SSN/SSGN strength of the US
Navy.
Rather it is focusing on the development
and rapid construction of more affordable advanced non-nuclear
submarines, including the latest version of the Type 039 Yuan-class
diesel-electric attack submarine with air-independent propulsion
(AIP), which provides extended stealthy submerged patrol endurance.
Currently there are 18 Type 039A and 039B
submarines in service, and there are indications that China intends
to build around 25 of the latest version – the Type 039D – by
around 2030. This would bring the Yuan-class
fleet to about 35 submarines.
While not confirmed there is a
possibility that some of these new Yuan-class submarines could also
be equipped with lithium-ion batteries in addition to AIP, and this
would further enhance their submerged endurance and performance.
There are also indications that China may
be developing advanced all-electric
(SSE) small submarines
(around 50m in length, 400-500 tonnes displacement) fitted with AIP
or lithium-ion batteries, or a combination of both, with no on-board
diesel generators. The first generation of these submarines would
have a submerged patrol endurance of around 3 weeks, and would likely
be used for coastal patrols and special operations.
As
advanced battery performance increases, it is conceivable that in the
2030s and 2040s these SSEs could acquire blue-water capabilities,
with a submerged patrol endurance of 30-40 days, fast stealthy
submerged transit capability of 500-700nm in 24 to 48 hours, and
strengthened sensor and combat system capabilities.
In addition to new submarine types China
is also developing and deploying a range of autonomous underwater
vehicles and extensive sub-sea sensor networks. Open-source
intelligence sources (OSINT) suggest that China is already able to
detect the approach of foreign submarines at a distance of around
1700nm (3100km) from the Chinese coastline, which is outside the
maximum operational range of the Tomahawk cruise missile (2500km).
The strategy of China’s PLA Navy (PLAN)
is quite clear – increasingly early detection of potentially
hostile submarines complemented by deployment of quantitatively
superior ASW submarine forces sufficient to make the risks of moving
into cruise missile range from the Chinese mainland very high.
China’s sub-sea defence capabilities
will be significant by 2030, and it is reasonable to assume that they
will continue to develop and strengthen through the 2030s and 2040s,
across the timeframe that Australia will be acquiring its SSN/SSGN
force.
5.
Can we handle the things anyway?
To
get the capability the USN wants in its Block V Virginia class
requires a submarine that is nearly as big as an SSBN
(nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine), at 140 metres in
length and 10,000 plus tonnes displacement – nearly twice the
length of Collins and three times the displacement. And that needs a
crew of around 130, compared to 60 for Collins.
Australia
will have to develop local capacity and assure access to relevant
knowledge to solve unexpected issues involving unfamiliar technology.
Ensuring that this capability is available could require changes
beyond the Defence acquisition sphere, such as considering the
position of the Defence Science and Technology Group in Australian
nuclear research.
Successful
delivery of the boats will be followed by high costs of ownership.
The Block V boats are projected to have a service life of about 33
years, with an operational cycle of 6 years followed by a 1.5 year
major refit (EDSRA – Extended Dry-docking Selected Restricted
Availability), which
is estimated to require 290,000 days of labour.
This includes the time required to ‘layup’ the nuclear propulsion
reactor and make it safe before dry-docking and during the refit.
Another
major issue, now confirmed by PM Morrison’s announcement of an East
Coast base for Australia’s future submarines, is the need to change
the mode of operation and force posture to deploy large SSN/SSGNs. A
submarine as large as the Virginia Block V will be difficult to
transit covertly through the Indonesian archipelago (Oberon
submarines of yore have detected the passage of Soviet SSNs).
Further, as noted above, in some circumstances trying to navigate the
Indonesian archipelago could become subject to home nation challenge.
The
East Coast base will allow RAN SSGNs to deploy into deep water and
transit into the Pacific around New Guinea, with minimal risk of
detection and without loss of time on station. Presumably, much of
the operational maintenance for nuclear powered submarines will be
concentrated there, much as it is for the Collins class in Fremantle.
We do not know as yet where the major refits (currently undertaken in
Adelaide for the Collins class) are to be performed for the nuclear
powered submarines.
It
should be noted that, when announcing the new East Coast submarine
base, PM Morrison confirmed that the existing West Coast base (HMAS
Stirling) would be retained for Indian Ocean submarine operations.
6.
Conclusions
What
most people don’t seem to notice (and we suspect the government
doesn’t comprehend) is that the single issue about what to do with
the Attack class program is leading to commitments for many aspects
of national security that are quickly becoming irreversible, or will
incur very significant expenditures to undo.
Australia’s
government seems to be approaching the nation’s future security
within the same strategic mindset that has seen Australian soldiers
in the Middle East over the last two decades. This time they are
attempting to replace the troops with technologically sophisticated
platforms but haven’t noticed that the focus of policy is not an
ethnically riven failed state but a major global power.
The
decision to acquire nuclear propelled submarines assumes that this
technology will retain operational effectiveness across the span of
more than two decades before they become a physical reality. This is
a proposition that needs to be thoroughly tested against the response
of the global power, manifest in China’s rapidly developing sub-sea
defence capabilities over the same period.
Derek
Woolner & David Glynne Jones
March
2022
Explanatory
note: Submarine hull designations
SSI/SSP: Attack
Submarine (Diesel-Electric with Air-Independent Propulsion)
SS/SSK: Attack Submarine (Diesel-Electric
Power)
SSG: Guided Missile Submarine (Diesel-Electric Power)
SSN: Attack
Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSGN: Guided Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSBN: Ballistic
Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
SSE: Attack
Submarine (All-electric Power) (W&J proposed classification)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hull_classifications#S
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