Woolner & Jones

Addendum: And Then, What Else Might China Do? When you attempt to join the big league, it should be no surprise that the established players take you seriously. So, as Australia has sought a place in the strategic manoeuvring in the conflict between China and Taiwan through the formation of AUKUS, it should be no surprise that China would take steps to neutralise Australia's presence. Already strongly placed with its submarine warfare developments, China is now developing further options to restrict Australia's capacity to mount a submarine-based challenge to China's interests. One such option became apparent in late March when the text of a proposed security arrangement between the People's Republic of China and the Solomon Islands was leaked. Much of the text was vague and imprecise but it immediately raised the possibility that China might be setting up conditions that would allow it to position naval vessels in the Solomons. Even the faint possibility of

Speaking about the next RAN submarines on ABC Insiders on Sunday 6 March Australia’s Defence Minister Peter Dutton spoke the magic words ’vertical launch system’. Answering a question on whether Australia would contemplate joining military action against China in defence of Taiwan he said that “keeping Australians safe” led to the AUKUS agreement “to acquire the nuclear .. sub capability .. [that] allows potentially a vertical launch system or some use of missiles which would speak to a very strong deterrence message.” This is virtually a commitment to acquiring the US Virginia-class SSN (nuclear-powered attack submarine), as the UK’s Astute-class SSN does not have a vertical launch system (VLS) in its design. It also sets free a huge mound of wriggling policy and operational worms. PM Morrison and Defence Minister Dutton are at odds over the timing of the submarine decision (post-election or in the next few weeks) and the feasibility of the project is supposed to be the subject of a

For the third time Australia has severed relationships with a partner selected to assist the RAN acquire submarines. The decision to acquire nuclear powered submarines using the newly created AUKUS arrangements and prematurely end the Attack class program adds to the list of barely considered ‘politicians picks’ in Australian defence equipment selection, along with classics such as the F-111 and F-35. Yet although the agreement of the United States to release its nuclear propulsion technology is historically significant, subsequent discussion largely has been misguided. The submarines will be the last technology that Australia will see delivered and it is likely that the digital technologies of cyber warfare, quantum computing and artificial intelligence will have transformed the nature of warfare before they have arrived, suggesting that the acquisition of the submarines is by no means certain, at least in the terms that have so far been revealed. Despite an undertaking to constru